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THE "BLIND LOOK" RULE OF REASON:

FEDERAL COURTS' PECULIAR TREATMENT
OF NCAA AMATEURISM RULES
TIBOR NAGY*

The plaintiff is currently a student, not a businessman in the
traditionalsense ....

Even in the increasingly commercial modern world, this Court
believes there is still validity to the Athenian concept of a
complete education derived from fostering full growth of both
mind and body ....This Court is hard-pressedto see any validity
to the parties' interpretationof college football players like Brad
Gaines as 'sellers' and NCAA schools and professionalfootball
teams as 'buyers' in an economic market.2
I. INTRODUCTION

On August 24, 2004, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) rendered a final decision with respect to the eligibility of Colorado
University (CU) football player Jeremy Bloom. Bloom happens to be talented
in two sports: in addition to being a star kickoff and punt returner during his
time at CU, Bloom is the world's third-ranked freestyle moguls skier. Not
coming from an affluent background, Bloom decided earlier in the year to
accept endorsement money from two ski apparel companies in order to help
fund his training for the 2006 Olympics. While the NCAA's rules on
amateurism allow college football players to accept money from professional
baseball teams and allow CU to profit from sales of Bloom's No. 15 jersey
(with no share of the sales going to Bloom), the cartel's 3 rules do not allow
* Law clerk to the Honorable Melinda Harmon, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, 2003-05; J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; B.A., Dartmouth College, 2000; National
Trial Competition Northeastern Champion, 2003.
1. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding that the NCAA's eligibility
rules for college athletes are not and should not be subject to federal antitrust law).
2. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that the NCAA's
eligibility rules for college athletes are not and should not be subject to federal antitrust law).
3. As sports economist Robert Tollison has noted, "economists generally view the NCAA as a
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college athletes to accept endorsement money.4 Bloom was therefore held
ineligible to play college football, a decision that caused him to lose his
scholarship at CU and could potentially destroy his aspirations of playing
professional football in the future.
Most commentators denounced the NCAA's decision as wrongheaded,
self-serving, hypocritical, and even vindictive, 5 and many other similar stories
can be told about the college sports cartel. 6 College athletes have repeatedly
brought suit to challenge the NCAA's bylaws, principally on antitrust grounds,
and they will undoubtedly continue to do so. 7 To date, however, every
antitrust challenge to the NCAA's eligibility rules has failed. Federal courts
have consistently held that the NCAA's preservation of "amateurism" is, as a
matter of law, a valid excuse for what would otherwise be flagrant violations
of the Sherman Act. Viewing the NCAA as a purchaser of labor and college
athletes as suppliers, the NCAA is allowed to engage in price fixing: it limits

cartel." Robert Tollison, Understanding the Antitrust Economics of Sports Leagues, Spring 2000
ANTITRUST at 21, 22. See also ARTHUR FLEISHER III, et al., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR (1992); Lesley Chenoweth Estevao, Student Athletes
Must FindNew Ways to Piercethe NCAA 's Legal Armor, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 243, 248 n.22
(2002) ("Economists who have studied the NCAA argue that the Sanity Code [a measure passed by
the NCAA in 1948] marks the beginning of the NCAA behaving as an effective cartel"); Daniel R.
Marburger & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Is Title IX Really to Blame for the Decline in Intercollegiate
Men's Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 65, 81 (2003) ("the NCAA has been
repeatedly criticized by economists for acting as an economic cartel").
4. NCAA, .2004-2005 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION DIVISION I MANUAL art.
12.1.1 (2004).
5. See Michael Bradley, NCAA Shows Its True Colors by Shunning Two-Sport Star, at
(last
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/writers/michaelbradley/08/19/bloom.ncaa/index.html
visited Apr. 1, 2005); Les Carpenter, NCAA Wins the Gold Medal for Hypocrisy, SEATTLE TIMES
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/collegesports/
at
available
2004),
22,
(Aug.
2002011856 es22.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005); Bob Molinaro, NCAA Ruling Leaves Skier Out in
the Cold-But Why?, VIRGINIA-PILOT (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://home.hamptonroads.com/
stories/story.cfm?story-74755&ran= 104191 (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
6. Just two days after it held Bloom ineligible, the cartel rendered its decision holding Mike
Williams, the University of Southern California's star wide receiver and one of the most talented
players in contemporary college football, permanently ineligible to play. Williams had attempted to
leave college football for the pros after a federal district court held the NFL's rule requiring players to
be at least three years out of high school to be in violation of federal antitrust law. Clarett v. NFL, 306
F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). That federal court ruling was subsequently overturned, and
Williams immediately attempted to return to USC. See NCAA Turns Down Williams's Reinstatement
Bid, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/football/ncaa/O8/26/williams.denied.ap/ index.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
7. A prominent Seattle class action law firm, for example, recently filed an antitrust suit against
the NCAA on behalf of college football players denied scholarship money (known as "walk-on"
players) because of the cartel's rule limiting the number of scholarships that can be given out per
team. See In re NCAA Division I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation, Civ. Action No. 04-1254
(W.D. Wash. May 19, 2004).
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the amount of scholarship money and benefits (e.g., health and disability
insurance) cartel members 'can pay their athletes. 8 Similarly, the NCAA is
allowed to keep its athletes dependent on their individual schools: athletes
cannot switch schools without losing a year of eligibility, cannot speak to
agents about prospective employment with professional teams, and cannot
accept endorsement money. 9 All of this, the courts have held, is justified not
by any economic reasons but by the NCAA's purported desire to ensure that
college athletes "be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises."' 0
This article argues that the federal courts' treatment of the NCAA's
amateurism rules is critically flawed and cannot be explained by any
principled application of antitrust law. The NCAA's amateurism rules, by
which I mean the no-compensation, 1 no-draft, 12 and no-agent 13 rules, have
been criticized by numerous authorities.14 No one, however, has yet provided
8. NCAA, supra note 4, arts. 12.1, 12.5.2, 15.1.
9. Id. NCAA, supra note 4, arts. 14.5; 12.1.1(g) & 12.3; 15.1.
10. Id. art. 2.9; see e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992) ("We should not
permit the entry of professional athletes and their agents into NCAA sports because the cold
commercial nature of professional sports would not only destroy the amateur status of college
athletics but more importantly would interfere with the athletes proper focus on their educational
pursuits and direct their attention to the quick buck in pro sports").
11. NCAA, supra note 4, arts. 12.1, 12.5.2, 15.1.
12. Id. art. 12.2.4. As discussed below, in October 2002 the NCAA amended its prohibition
against college athletes' entering a professional draft by making an exception for Division I-A football
players, the athletes most severely affected by the restriction. Under the new rule, Division I-A
football players are allowed to enter a professional draft once during their college careers without
jeopardizing their eligibility. Id. art. 12.2.4.2.3. Because the NFL has a rule barring players from
entering the professional league until they are three years out of high school, college players typically
do not have a need for entering a draft more than once. Despite this more lenient rule, I include the
no-draft rule among the amateurism rules discussed in this article because the amendment took place
after all of the cases to address the amateurism rules and several of the opinions focus on the old nodraft rule. Furthermore, because the no-compensation rule is the most controversial and most
economically significant of the rules, the fact that the no-draft rule has been amended does not lessen
the significance of the issues discussed in this article.
13. Id. arts. 12.1.1(g), 12.3.
14. See, e.g., WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES
(1995); JAMES DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
(2003); ARTHUR FLEISHER III, et al., supra note 3; ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS

(1998); Chad Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust
Defense in NCAA Compensation Cases, 24 HAML1NE L. REV. 24 (2000); Stanton Wheeler,
Rethinking Amateurism and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 213 (2004); Marc Edelman, Note,
Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men's College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861
(2002); Sarah Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1581 (2003); Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1299 (1992)lhereinafter Sherman Act Invalidation]; David Warta, Comment, PersonalFoul:
Unnecessary Restriction of Endorsement and Employment Opportunitiesfor NCAA Student-Athletes,
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a unifying theory that explains why the six federal courts to publish decisions
on the issue all decided to uphold the NCAA's bylaws. This article provides
that theory. Part II provides a brief overview of the Rule of Reason, the
antitrust analysis applicable to restraints such as the NCAA's amateurism
rules, and takes a close look at NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,' 5 the only Supreme Court opinion to apply the Rule of Reason to
the NCAA (though to rules having to do with TV contracts and not to any of
the restraints on athletes). Part III reviews each of the six published federal
court decisions to squarely address antitrust challenges to the NCAA
amateurism rules. 16 Part IV then argues that these decisions cannot be
explained by any principled application of antitrust law but instead only by the
personal values and beliefs of the individual judges involved: the opinions
reveal that these judges simply refused to view college athletes as suppliers of
labor, felt that the athletes' "proper" focus should be on academics and not
professional sports, and had an open aversion to "cold commercialism" and the
"quick buck of pro sports."1 7 Rather than confront the facts in the cases, which
were often squarely at odds with their stated beliefs, these judges decided to
impose their values on college athletes as a matter of law. As the lone
dissenter in these cases put it, when "confronted with the clash between
soothing nostalgia and distressing reality," these judges chose the former.' 8 In
light of the fact that the victims of this judicial social engineering are
disproportionately African American athletes and the beneficiaries are
predominantly affluent white men (as were all the judges involved), 19 this
39 TULSA L. REv. 419 (2003).
15. 468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter Bd.of Regents].
16. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850
(N.D. Ind. 1990), affd, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 738; Jones, 392 F.
Supp. at 295; Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
17. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091.
18. Id. at 1100.
19. Black students typically comprise over fifty percent of the athletic teams in "revenue sports,"
which are the sports that actually generate profits for NCAA members and which likewise are the
sports in which the college athletes suffer the greatest antitrust injury as a result of the NCAA's
restraints of trade. See Table 7: Comparison of Black Student-Athletes to Total Student-Athletes in
2001-02 Race Demographics of NCAA Member Institutions' Athletic Personnel, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/race demographics/2001-02/2001-02 race demo.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2005). In contrast, in the 2001-02 academic year 82.2% of athletic directors at
Division I schools and 80% of the head coaches of Division I-A football and Division I basketball
teams were white men. See id. at Table 34b, p. 85, Athletics AdministrativeStaff: 2001-02 Division I
Percentiles & Table 42a, p. 120, Head Coaches: 2001-02 Division I Figures. As Walter Byers,
Executive Director of the NCAA from 1951-87 has pointed out, the major beneficiaries of restraints
on athletes' compensation are the NCAA members' athletic directors and head coaches, most of whom
have inordinately high salaries. See BYERS, supra note 14, at 340. Numerous Division I football and
basketball coaches, for example, currently have annual salaries of over $1 million. See In re NCAA
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trend in the federal judiciary is particularly disturbing.
As new challenges to the NCAA's amateurism rules are brought, courts
must recognize what these judges allowed themselves to forget: social values,
particularly values that are not shared across racial and socioeconomic groups,
have no place in a legitimate Rule of Reason analysis. Federal judges,
whatever their own personal beliefs, should no longer uphold an aristocratic,
Victorian notion of the "proper" education of young men as a valid defense to
by a cartel
Sherman Act violations, particularly when that notion is enforced
20
hypocrisy.
rampant
its
whose own leaders and supporters admit

II.

THE RULE OF REASON AND NCAA V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

A.

The Rule of Reason

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 2 1 The Supreme Court, however, has long held that this provision was
intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade. 22 Ordinarily,
Division I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation, Civ. Action No. 04-1254 (W.D. Wash. May 19,
2004), Original Class Action Complaint at 15 (citing an open records request filed by si.com); see
also DUDERSTADT, supranote 14, at 154.
20. The single most authoritative and extensive account of the NCAA's hypocrisy is Walter
Byers's, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES (1995). Byers was
Executive Director of the NCAA from 1951 to 1987 and was directly involved in (or altogether
responsible for) developing and implementing many of the NCAA's eligibility rules. Since the 1990s,
however, Byers has pushed for reform of the NCAA's rules, calling in particular for an end to the
amateurism rules discussed in this article. Byers's book provides a detailed account of the history of
the amateurism rules and a plain statement of their true purpose. With respect to the rule against
endorsement contracts, for example, Byers states the following:
But the NCAA constitutional restriction prevents direct dealings between the commercial, forprofit world and the athlete. This is not about amateurism. This has to do with who controls the
negotiations and gets the money. The colleges strengthened their grip on the athlete at a time
when other prominent 'amateur' organizations [e.g., the U.S. Olympic Committee, the U.S. Lawn
Tennis Association, and the U.S. Golf Association] have been relaxing their power over players.
Id. at 346. As sports economist Andrew Zimablist noted in his book about college athletes, UNPAID
PROFESSIONALS, the U.S. Olympic Committee, an association that was once identified as the leading
institution of amateurism, no longer identifies itself with the principle. ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at
20. When asked about the change, the Committee's Director of Public Information replied simply:
"We wanted to rid ourselves of the hypocrisy." Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
22. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) ("Since the earliest
decisions of this Court interpreting this provision, we have recognized that it was intended to prohibit
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therefore, "whether particular concerted action violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act is determined through chse-by-case application of the so-called
Rule of Reason." 23 Under this rule, "the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
24
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.
Specifically, the Rule of Reason comprises three steps involving shifting
burdens of proof:
(1) The plaintiff shows that the agreement has a substantially adverse
effect on competition.
(2) The defendant must then show that the challenged conduct promotes a
sufficiently procompetitive objective.
(3) In rebuttal, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the restraint is not
25
reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective.
Two points must be emphasized about this analysis. First, a defendant's
procompetitive justification for a challenged agreement must actually be
procompetitive-that is, it must actually enhance competition. Generally, the
Court has held that noncommercial objectives are not legally cognizable
justifications for anticompetitive agreements. The leading case is National
Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States.26 In that case, the United
States brought suit under Sherman Act Section 1 challenging a canon of ethics
prohibiting competitive bidding among professional engineers. 27 The society
that instituted the canon argued that it served "the purpose of minimizing the
risk that competition would produce inferior engineering work endangering
the public safety." 28 The Court concluded that the society's "asserted defense
rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Rule of Reason frequently
applied in antitrust litigation," 29 and it upheld the district court's decision to
reject that defense without even making any findings on the issue. 30 The Court
acknowledged that engineering "is an important and learned profession" and
that the society sought "to preserve the profession's 'traditional' method of

only unreasonable restraints of trade."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
23. Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 723.
24. Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
25. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); Pocono Invitational
Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing United States v. Brown
Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)).
26. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
27. Id. at 681.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id.
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selecting professional engineers." 3 1 Nevertheless, these kinds of arguments
simply are not cognizable under the Rule of Reason. Rather, the Court held,
"the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive
conditions."3 2 The Court offered the following analysis:
Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust
inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may
fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions. This
principle is apparent in even the earliest of cases applying the
Rule of Reason ....

The early cases also foreclose the argument

that because of the special characteristics of a particular industry,
monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and
commerce than competition. That kind of argument is properly
addressed to Congress and may justify an exemption from the
statute for specific industries, but it is not permitted by the Rule of
Reason. As the Court observed in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, "restraints of trade within the purview of the statute...
[can]not be taken out of that category by indulging in general
reasoning as to the expediency or nonexpediency of having made
of wisdom of the statute
the contracts, or the wisdom or want
'33
whichprohibited their being made.
The Court drove the point home by further noting that "the purpose of the
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the
34
Thus, even
public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry."

the "fact that engineers are often involved in large-scale projects significantly
35
affecting the public safety does not alter [the] analysis." In sum, as the Court
has affirmed in several other cases, 36 "the Rule of Reason does not support a
Id.at 684.
Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
Id.at 688-90 (quoting 221 U.S. at 65) (citations omitted).
Id.at 692.
Id. at 695.
36. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (striking down boycott
of the courts by public defenders in spite of the fact that their protest had a public interest element to
it); FTC v. Ind.Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465 (1986) (striking down agreement among dentists
to refuse to provide insurance companies with copies of their X-rays, despite the fact that dentists
argued that they were merely enforcing a state law preventing insurance companies from considering
the X-rays; the Court stated that the fact that "a particular practice may be unlawful is not, in itself, a
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

sufficient justification for collusion among competitors to prevent it"); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (striking down maximum price-fixing agreement among doctors,
despite the fact that the agreement allowed the doctors to agree on a common insurance scheme);
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defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable. ' 37
The second point worth noting is that the Rule of Reason necessarily
involves a factual inquiry: plaintiffs must establish facts demonstrating the
anticompetitive effects of agreements and defendants must establish facts that
demonstrate actual procompetitive justifications.
Perhaps the clearest
statement of this point is Justice Brandeis's formulation of the Rule of Reason
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 38 a statement the Court has called
the "classic statement of the rule of reason: ,39
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences. 40
Thus, opinions applying the Rule of Reason ordinarily (1) point to factual
evidence (or the lack thereof) when analyzing both plaintiffs' proof of
anticompetitive effect and defendants' assertion of procompetitive justification
and (2) reject noncommercial justifications for the challenged restraint as
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding state bar association's minimum fee scale
unlawful under Sherman Act and specifically concluding that state's interest in regulating the legal
profession was not sufficient to exempt the fee scale from antitrust scrutiny); United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (holding that horizontal restraints by cooperative buying
association for small and medium sized regional supermarket chains constituted per se violation of
Sherman Act Section 1 despite the fact that the practices were necessary to allow smaller chains to
compete with larger, national chains, and stating that "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act
in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how
small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed
with respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the economy").
37. Nat7 Soc'y of ProflEngineers, 435 U.S. at 696.

38. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
39. MaricpoaCounty Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 343 n.13.
40. 246 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
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legally irrelevant.
B.

NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma

The only case in which the Supreme Court has applied the Rule of Reason
41
to the NCAA is NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.
In that case, plaintiffs, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, challenged
a television broadcasting plan (the "Plan") that the NCAA cartel enforced by
means of imposing a group boycott on schools that did not comply. 42 The
Plan limited the number of games that could be broadcast, fixed the prices that
could be charged, and generally benefited smaller schools at the expense of the
bigger football powerhouses. 43 The plaintiffs asserted that the Plan violated
Sherman Act Section 1.44
The Court initially noted that "[h]orizontal price fixing and output
limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se'
approach because the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so
high." 45 In such circumstances, the Court continued:
a restraint is presumed unreasonable without inquiry into the
particular market context in which it is found. Nevertheless, we
have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule
to this case. This decision is not based on a lack of judicial
experience with this type of arrangement, on the fact that the
NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our respectfor the
NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of
intercollegiate amateur athletics. Rather, what is critical is that
this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on
46
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.
Thus, the Court applied the "no noncommercial justifications" principle
and squarely rejected the notion that amateurism in and of itself is a legitimate
excuse for anticompetitive behavior by the NCAA. 47 Indeed, the principle of
amateurism was not even enough to move the NCAA's horizontal price fixing
41. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
42. Id. at 94-95.
43. Id.at 91-94.
44. Id.at 88.
45. Id. at 100.
46. Id.at 100-01 (emphasis added).
47. Id.at 101. The Court provided further elaboration highlighting this point in a footnote:
"While as the guardian of an important American tradition, the NCAA's motives must be accorded a
respectful presumption of validity, it is nevertheless well settled that good motives will not validate an
otherwise anticompetitive practice." Id.at 101 n.23 (citations omitted).
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activities from per se condemnation to a Rule of Reason standard. Rather, the
only acceptable justification, the "critical" thing, was that the NCAA operated
in an industry in which some horizontal restraints are essential if the product is
48
to be available at all.
Whether the TV contract restraints were essential to the product of
televised college football was undeniably a question offact. In conducting its
Rule of Reason analysis, the Court specifically relied on evidence submitted
to, and findings of fact made by, the district court. 49 The extensive trial record
included (1) evidence of the history of the NCAA television plan, including
the changes and development of the NCAA's broadcasting practices since
1938,50 and (2) the testimony of "a parade of witnesses" specifically
addressing the factual veracity of the NCAA's assertions of procompetitive
benefits. 5' The district court, relying on expert testimony and objective data,
specifically found that (1) "if member institutions were free to sell television
rights, many more games would be shown on television, and that the NCAA's
output restriction has the effect of raising the price the networks pay for
television rights;" 52 and (2) "by fixing a price for television rights to all games,
the NCAA creates a price structure that is unresponsive to viewer demand and
unrelated to the prices that would prevail in a competitive market." 53 The
Court's analysis specifically highlighted the critical significance of factual
findings to the Rule of Reason determination: "In light of these findings, it
cannot be said that 'the agreement on price is necessary to market the product
at all' . . . . The NCAA's efficiency justification is not supported by the
record."54
In light of this analysis, one would expect that the post-Regents cases
considering antitrust challenges to the NCAA's amateurism rules would
similarly (1) not rule in favor of the NCAA simply out of "respect for the
NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate
amateur athletics;" 55 and (2) would, instead, require the submission of
evidence (e.g., testimony from a "parade of witnesses") by both the plaintiffs
and the NCAA so that the court could make findings as to whether the
48. Id.at 101.
49. Id.at 104-08.
50. Id. at 89-94.
51. 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1309 (W.D. Okla. 1982), affd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), affd, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
52. Bd.of Regents, 468 U.S. at 105.
53. Id.at 106.
54. Id. at 114-15 (quoting Broad. Music Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979)).
55. Id.at 101.
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challenged rules are in fact "necessary to market the product at all." 56 Quite
the contrary, not a single court that has considered the question has required
the NCAA to actually prove that the particular amateurism rule at issue was
necessary to market the product of college football. In other words, no federal
court has ever actually received evidence and made findings on the issue of
whether particular amateurism rules are in fact essential to the NCAA's
product. Rather, these courts have simply assumed that the amateurism rules
are necessary.5 7 While the ultimate explanation for this appears to be
psychosocial, as discussed at length below, there is a portion of Board of
Regents that is partially to blame.
As noted above, early in its analysis the Court rejected mere "respect for
the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of
intercollegiate amateur athletics" as a basis for not striking down horizontal
restraints by the NCAA as illegal per se.5 8 Rather, the Court explicitly stated
that it would apply the Rule of Reason because college football is an industry
in which some "horizontal restraints on competition are essentialif the product
is to be available at all." 59 "A myriad of rules," the Court explained, "affecting
such matters as the size of the field, the number of players on a team, and the
extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must
60
be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which institutions compete.
Justice Stevens, however, then wrote several sentences of dicta-premised,
apparently, on nothing more than his personal opinion-that have become the
final word on the amateurism issue:
Moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of
football-college football. The identification of this "product"
56. Id.at 114.
57. See infra Part III; see also Pekron, supra note 14, at 53 ("Whenever a court of law has
discussed amateurism, the court has always simply assumed that it is necessary to produce college
athletics. However, the NCAA has never been required to prove that without amateurism, college
athletics would be indistinguishable from professional athletics"). The author is unaware of any
comprehensive survey evidence addressing the issue of the necessity of the NCAA's amateurism rules
to the preservation of college football or other college sports as distinct goods. However, there are
significant empirical facts that suggest that the viewing public would not flip the channel simply
because the players on a college football team were receiving an increased stipend or were receiving a
share of the endorsement money that their coaches currently keep all to themselves. In 2003, for
example, both the Nebraska legislature and the California senate passed bills that called for their
states' schools to pay college athletes. See Legislature Votes to Pay Cornhuskers,N.Y. TIMES, April
12, 2003, at S3; Steve Wieberg, NCAA's Extra FundingBenefits Athletes, USA TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2003-12-23-ncaa-athlete-welfare x.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2005); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
58. Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
59. Id.(emphasis added).
60. Id.
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with an academic tradition differentiates college football from and
makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might
otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league
baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the
"product," athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend
61
class, and the like.
The language in this dicta is directly on point, at least with respect to the
most hotly contested and economically significant of the amateurism rules: it
says in plain English that athletes must not be paid The language is also,
however, plainly dicta, plainly not binding, and plainly not based on facts of
any sort. Justice Stevens's casual ending of the last sentence indicates the
musing tone with which this rambling dicta was written: and the like. The
passage itself states a possibility that might be borne out in a case that actually
developed a factual record: it is only the identification with an academic
tradition (i.e., a player's affiliation with a school), and not any restrictions on a
players' receiving endorsement money (i.e., on his being paid) that is essential
to the product of college football. Ironically, the Court itself has long warned
of the dangers of "voluntary statement[s] on a point not in issue:" 62 "obiter
dicta, like the proverbial chickens of destiny, come home to roost sooner or
later in a very uncomfortable way to the Judges who have uttered them, and
63
are a great source of embarrassment in future cases."
III. AMATEURISM CASES BEFORE AND AFTER BOARD OFREGENTS

There are six published decisions in which federal courts consider
Sherman Act challenges to NCAA amateurism rules, two before Board of
64 As noted above, none of these decisions contains a
Regents and four after it.
61. Id. at 101-02.
62. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950) (quoting Bowen, L.J., in Cooke v. New River Co.,
38 Ch.D. 56, 70-7 1).
63. Id.; see also U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 407 n.8 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bowen, L.J. and
noting "dangers inherent in a court's reaching out to decide issues not essential to the outcome of the

case before it").
64. There are two other cases rejecting Sherman Act challenges to the NCAA's eligibility rules:
Hairston v. Pacific-10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1495 (W.D. Wash. 1995), aIJd 101 F.3d 1315 (9th
Cir. 1996); and Smith v. NCAA, 978 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Penn. 1997), affd 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir.
1998). These cases, however, are not examples of direct challenges to the NCAA's amateurism rules.
Hairston involved a Section 1 challenge to sanctions imposed by the Pac-10, pursuant to NCAA
rules, on the University of Washington football team for violations of the no-compensation rule.
Hairston, 893 F. Supp. at 1496. The district court applied the Rule of Reason and granted summary
judgment for defendants, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Hairston, however, did not involve a
legitimate challenge to any of the NCAA's bylaws. Rather, the plaintiffs' claims were "based solely
on their belief that the penalty was excessive and that, therefore, it must have been the product of an
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record developed by a trial court that considered whether the rules in question
were in fact essential to the product of college football. Courts either
conducted nothing more than a "blind look" Rule of Reason analysis, simply
assuming that the amateurism rules were not unreasonable restraints of trade,
or they held, in a similar vein, that the Sherman Act does not even apply to the
amateurism rules. To date, therefore, the federal courts have not actually
conducted a legally sound Rule of Reason analysis of the NCAA's amateurism
rules.
A.

Cases Before Board of Regents
1. Jones v. NCAA

In Jones v. NCAA, 65 a district court considered a Sherman Act Section 1
challenge to the NCAA's most basic amateurism rule: the prohibition on
athletes' receiving monetary compensation for playing sports. 66 The plaintiff,
Stephen Jones, was a student at Northeastern University who wished to play
on the school's hockey team. 67 Jones, however, "had played for a succession
of Canadian and American 'amateur' hockey teams" during high school and for
two years after graduating from high school and before enrolling at
Northeastern. 68 Because he received compensation from these teams, the
NCAA declared Jones ineligible to play at Northeastern. 69
The district court noted that "[a] threshold question is whether the
Sherman Act reaches the actions of N.C.A.A. members in setting eligibility
standards for intercollegiate athletics. ' 70 The Court concluded that it does not,

illegal conspiracy in violation of antitrust laws." Id. Thus, the Hairston plaintiffs were concerned
about a conspiracy by other NCAA schools against the University of Washington, and not with the
economic exploitation of college athletes. Similarly, Smith involved the eligibility of graduate and
not undergraduate students, and the bylaw challenged in that case was not one of the amateurism rules
discussed in this article. Smith, 978 F. Supp. at 215. Furthermore, Smith did not involve any of the
revenue sports, and there was, to put it simply, clearly no money at stake with respect to the
challenged bylaw. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both the district court and the Third Circuit
held that none of the NCAA's eligibility rules were subject to the Sherman Act because those rules are
noncommercial in nature. 978 F. Supp. at 217-18; 139 F.3d at 184-86. Both courts reached this
conclusion simply by citing to the cases discussed in this article, particularly to the dicta in Bd. of
Regents. Id.
65. 392 F. Supp. at 295.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 296.

68. Id. at 297.
69. Id. at 297-98.
70. Id. at 303.
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offering the following analysis:
The plaintiff is currently a, student, not a businessman in the
traditional sense, and certainly not a "competitor" within the
contemplation of the antitrust laws. The "competition" which the
plaintiff seeks to protect does not originate in the marketplace or
as a sector of the economy but in the hockey rink as part of the
educational program of a major university. And, of equal
significance, plaintiff has so far not shown how the action of the
N.C.A.A. in setting eligibility guidelines has any nexus to
commercial or business activities in which the defendant might
71
engage.
Thus, because Judge Tauro, a 1953 graduate of Brown University, viewed
Jones as a "student" and "not [as] a businessman," the NCAA was not, in the
court's view, subject to the Sherman Act at all. The judge's social outlook
quite literally created a federal antitrust exemption for a multimillion dollar
sports cartel.
For good measure, Judge Tauro provided the alternative analysis if one
assumed that the NCAA was not in fact exempt from the Sherman Act. In that
case, he concluded, Jones still could not make a substantial showing that he
was entitled to relief because "[i]n order to make out a group boycott claim the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant's purpose was to exclude a person or
72
group from the market or accomplish some other anti-competitive objective."
Judge Tauro summarily concluded that Jones would not be able to make this
showing:
The N.C.A.A. was originally established to promote amateurism
in college sports and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into the
educational programs of its member institutions. The N.C.A.A.
eligibility rules were not designed to coerce students into staying
away from intercollegiate athletics, but to implement the
N.C.A.A. basic principles of amateurism, principles which have
been at the heart of the Association since its founding. Any
limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the
incidental result of the organization's pursuit of its legitimate
73
goals.
What was the basis for these various conclusions about the NCAA?
Nothing. Just as Judge Tauro had a certain preconceived view of who Jones

71. Id.
72. Id. at 304.
73. Id.
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was (a "student" and "not a businessman"), he had a certain preconceived view
of what the NCAA was: a benevolent protector of principles of amateurism.
Thus, despite the absence of any relevant language in the statute or any
controlling case law, the Jones court decided to create a blanket exemption for
the NCAA from federal antitrust regulation of its restraints on college athletes.
The court relied on absolutely no evidence in reaching this conclusion, but
instead based its decision entirely on its own assumptions about the NCAA
and about college athletes. While these assumptions may have had some
validity at Brown University in the early 1950s, the NCAA's own executive
director at the time Stephen Jones filed suit has stated in no uncertain terms
that the rule Jones was challenging was "not about amateurism" but was in
reality about "who controls the negotiations and gets the money." 74
2. Justice v. NCAA
Justice v. NCAA 75 offers a longer but no less na 've analysis of the collegeathlete plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims. In Justice, several members of the
University of Arizona's football team had received cash payments as
compensation for their efforts on the field. 76 The NCAA sanctioned the entire

team by prohibiting the University of Arizona from participating in postseason football, an activity which typically generates substantial revenues for
the school 77 and which gives the players substantial exposure to NFL scouts.
Four students who had not received cash payments challenged the sanctions,
asserting a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.

78

Unlike Judge Tauro, Judge Kelleher had no trouble concluding that the
NCAA's amateurism rules have "a substantial effect on interstate commerce"
and thus are subject to the Sherman Act. 79 Moving to the plaintiffs' group
boycott claim, however, Judge Kelleher reached the same conclusion as the
court in Jones: the sanctions at issue "have been shown to lack an
74. BYERS, supra note 14, at 346.
75. 577 F. Supp. at 356.
76. Id. at 362.
77. Postseason football alone generated $227,204,568 in total revenues for NCAA members
during the 2002-03 season. See 2002-03 Postseason Football: 5 Year Summary of Gross Receipts,
available at wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/postseason football/sumgrossreceipts.pdf (last visited
Apr. 4, 2005).
78. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 361.
79. Id. at 378 (citations omitted). The Court initially concluded that the four football players in
the case lacked standing: "the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs' allegation of threatened injury
to their ability to compete for professional contracts is too remote to meet the standing requirement of
Section 16 of the Clayton Act." Id. The Court, however, decided not to dismiss for lack of standing
and instead disposed of the case on the merits.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:2

anticompetitive purpose and to be directly related to the NCAA objectives of
preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition. '' 80 Just how this was
"shown" is not indicated. Nothing in the record is pointed to, no evidence is
discussed, nothing is written to suggest Judge Kelleher, a 1935 graduate of
Williams College, did anything other than simply assume the NCAA had the
best of intentions.
More significantly, from a legal standpoint, the Justice court applied the
wrong legal standard to the sanctions. The court's conclusion that the
sanctions were lawful was based not on a balancing of anticompetitive effect
and procompetitive justification but rather on Judge Kelleher's unsubstantiated
determination that the sanctions had no anticompetitive purpose:
In sum, it is clear that the NCAA is now engaged in two distinct
kinds of rulemaking activity. One type, exemplified by the rules in
Hennessey and Jones, is rooted in the NCAA's concern for the
protection of amateurism; the other type is increasingly
accompanied by a discernible economic purpose. The NCAA
sanctions at issue here are clearly of the former variety. Because
the sanctions evince no anticompetitive purpose, are reasonably
related to the association's central objectives, and are not
not constitute an unreasonable
overbroad, the NCAA's action does
81
restraint under the Sherman Act.
This test, of course, is not the test for the Rule of Reason but rather is a
partial statement of the analysis to be applied in determining whether a sports
league's self-regulatory measures come within the Silver exception to per se
treatment for group boycotts. 82 Indeed, Judge Kelleher used precisely this
standard to make precisely that determination (i.e., that he should apply the
Rule of Reason and not the per se rule) just a couple pages earlier in the
opinion. 83 The Justice court's application of the same standard to its Rule of

80. Id. at 382.
81. Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
82. Under the Denver Rockets test, in order for conduct to fall within the Silver exception to per
se invalidation of group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal there must be proof that:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation "or otherwise";
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with the policy
justifying self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive than
necessary[; and]
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary
and which furnishes a basis for judicial review.
See Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Denver Rockets
v. All-Pro Mgmt. Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
83. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 381-82.
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Reason analysis is legal error. The court made no findings of anticompetitive
effect, made no findings of procompetitive benefits, and certainly made no
attempt to balance the two. The Justice court, quite simply, never conducted a
Rule of Reason analysis at all.
Furthermore, even the court's determination that the sanctions at issue
lacked an anticompetitive purpose is almost certainly erroneous under current
precedent, at least to the extent that the determination was made as a matter of
law and not as a matter of fact. In concluding that the NCAA sanctions lacked
an anticompetitive purpose, Judge Kelleher points not to evidence or the lack
thereof, but rather to precedent. The case he relied on most heavily was
Hennessey v. NCAA, 8 4 which upheld an NCAA bylaw limiting the number of
assistant coaches member institutions could employ for their Division I
football and basketball teams. 85 Hennessey, however, does not actually bear
Judge Kelleher's position out.
The Hennessey court, for example,
acknowledged that the bylaw at issue in that case was a cost-containment
measure (i.e., that it was a concerted agreement among cartel members to
lower the cost of their inputs). 86 It upheld the bylaw in spite of that fact
because of the dubious proposition that this cost-cutting was still principally
about amateurism:
Bylaw 12-1 was, with other rules adopted at the same time,
intended to be an "economy measure". In this sense it was both in
design and effect one having commercial impact. But the
fundamental objective in mind was to preserve and foster
competition in intercollegiate athletics by curtailing, as it were,
potentially monopolistic practices by the more powerful and to
reorient the programs into their traditional role as amateur sports
operating as part of the educational processes. 87
This reasoning, which will certainly strike most economists as naive, was
recently rejected by the Tenth Circuit in a case involving a challenge to an
NCAA bylaw limiting assistant coaches' salaries:
[T]he Hennessey court placed the burden of showing the
unreasonableness of the coaching restriction in that case on the
plaintiff and then found that the plaintiff could not make such a
showing because the rule had only recently been implemented. In
our analysis, the plaintiff only has the burden of establishing the
anticompetitive effect of the restraint at issue. Once the plaintiff
84. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 1152-53.
86. Id. at 1153.
87. Id.
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meets that burden, which the coaches have done in this case by
showing the naked and effective price-fixing character of the
agreement, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the
restraint as a "reasonable" one .... The NCAA asserts that the
Restricted Earnings Coaches [REC] Rule will help to maintain
competitive equity by preventing wealthier schools from placing a
more experienced, higher-priced coach in the position of
restricted-earnings coach. The NCAA again cites Hennessey to
support its position, and again we find Hennessey to be
unpersuasive for the reasons previously articulated .... Nowhere
does the NCAA prove that the salary restrictions enhance
competition, level an uneven playing field, or reduce coaching
88
inequities.
The propriety of the Tenth Circuit's insistence on the NCAA's proving its
self-serving contentions with evidence is shown by Walter Byers's own
account of the "enhances competition" argument: "I contend most of the
restraints are not there to enhance competition between and among the
colleges of NCAA Division I (and certainly not between and among the
colleges in the three divisions). The rules, based on a turn-of-the-centurytheory of amateurism, enforce a modern economic order."8 9
Furthermore, unlike Judge Kelleher, the Hennessey court acknowledged
that "[t]he motive which underlies a challenged restraint is but one element in
the examination of reasonableness," and that the ultimate issue must be the
"relative positive and negative effects" of the challenged restrictions. 90 In
Hennessey, the trial court did actually receive evidence on the effects of the
challenged bylaw. 91 As the Fifth Circuit noted, however, the evidence was
ultimately inconclusive: "The ultimate effects of the Bylaw, positive and
negative, are difficult to determine .... The court.., is rather of the view
admittedly bordering on speculation that the Bylaw will be of value in
achieving the ends sought by the association and will have in time lesser, not
' 92
greater, adverse effect upon assistant coaches than that already experienced. "
Nevertheless, apparently giving the NCAA the benefit of the doubt, the Fifth

88. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citations

omitted).
89. BYERS, supra note 14, at 390.

90. Id.
91. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153. The bylaw at issue in Hennessey had to do with the number of
assistant coaches a school could employ and was not one of the amateurism rules at issue in this
article.
92. Id.
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Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the NCAA.
In relying on Hennessey, therefore, the Justice court was relying on
questionable precedent that was based on admittedly speculative conclusions
and whose central holding has since been rejected by a court ruling on a
substantially similar NCAA bylaw with the benefit of a more developed
record. 93 Furthermore, like Judge Tauro, Judge Kelleher never considered any
evidence or made any findings of fact with respect to the procompetitve and
anticompetitive effects of the NCAA's amateurism rules. He simply asserted,
without any evidentiary basis, that the sanctions at issue "have been shown to
lack an anticompetitive purpose and to be directly related to the NCAA
94
objectives of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition."
Justice was, in sum, the second time a federal court gave the NCAA a free
pass out of an antitrust challenge.
B.

Post-Regents Cases

1. McCormack v. NCAA
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents served only to
strengthen federal courts' sense that students are "not businessmen" and that
amateurism is, as a matter of law, a valid defense to college athletes' Sherman
Act claims against the NCAA. The first case decided after Board of Regents
was McCormack v. NCAA.95 In McCormack, the NCAA imposed a "death
penalty" sanction on Southern Methodist University because the school had
been compensating its football players beyond the restrictions imposed by
NCAA bylaws. 96 Members of the football team brought suit, asserting that the
restrictions on athletes' compensation constituted illegal price fixing in
violation of Sherman Act Section 1.97
The district court dismissed the complaint without opinion. 98 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed. The appellate panel determined that it should apply the Rule

93. In Hennessey, the Bylaw was challenged just one month after it was adopted ("The ultimate
effects of the Bylaw, positive and negative, are difficult to determine on the basis of evidence taken

just a month after its effective date"). In Law the challenged bylaw had been in effect for over two
years. See Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1400 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.

1998).
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382.
845 F.2d at 1338.
Id.
at 1340.
Id.
Id.
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of Reason to the NCAA's compensation rules. 99 The panel then had no trouble
concluding that the NCAA's bylaws satisfied the Rule of Reason, despite the
fact that there was absolutely no evidence in the record -indeed, in spite of
the fact that the district court had made no findings of fact at all. How could it
do this? In the panel's mind, Board of Regents had decided the issue:
The essential inquiry under the rule-of-reason analysis is whether
the challenged restraint enhances competition. Applying this test,
we have little difficulty in concluding that the challenged
restrictions are reasonable. The Supreme Court indicated strongly
in Board of Regents that such was the case. 10 0
Under governing case law and basic principles of appellate review, the
panel clearly should have remanded for factual findings on the anticompetitive
effects and procompetitive benefits of the challenged restraint. 10' Instead,
Justice Stevens's offhand remark in a case that had nothing to do with
amateurism rules served as the sole basis for the Fifth Circuit's decision on the
issue.
2. Gaines v. NCAA
An even more disturbing result was reached by the court in Gaines v.
NCAA. 10 2 The plaintiff in Gaines was a Division I-A football player who had
violated the NCAA's no-draft and no-agent rules, and who, after failing to be
picked up in the NFL draft, sought collegiate reinstatement. 103 The plaintiff
brought suit under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, seeking an injunction. 0 4
The district court began its analysis by questioning whether the NCAA's
eligibility rules are subject to federal antitrust law. 05 Undeterred by the lack
of any mention of the NCAA amidst the various statutory exemptions to

99. Id. at 1344.

100. Id.
101. See Homsby Oil Co., Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., Inc., 714 F.2d 1384, 1392 (5th Cir.
1983) ("The rule of reason inquiry focuses on the competitive significance of a particular restraint, to
be measured by reference to 'the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed,' as well as the actual impact of this restraint on competition") (emphasis
added) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); N. Miss.
Communications, Inc. v. Jones, 792 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that "the court should
properly have applied the rule of reason and made a finding as to whether the agreement promoted or
suppressed competition" but deciding not to remand case because the district court had made other
"findings [that] are sufficient for us to make the necessary determination").
102. 746 F. Supp. at 738.
103. Id.at 740.
104. Id. at 741.
105. Id. at 742.
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federal antitrust regulation 10 6 or by the fact that the Supreme Court had
squarely stated that "respect for amateurism" was not a basis for such
exemption. 107 Judge Wiseman held that the NCAA's eligibility rules are
exempt from the Sherman Act; and he did so precisely out of respect for
amateurism. 08 Having adduced no evidence on the issue and thus having
made no relevant findings of fact, Judge Wiseman, a 1952 graduate of
Vanderbilt University, quite literally deferred first, to the NCAA's opinion of
whether it should be subject to the Sherman Act and second, to his nostalgic
sense of neo-classical education:
According to the NCAA Constitution, the purposes of the NCAA
eligibility Rules are to maintain amateur intercollegiate athletics
"as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as
an integral part of the student body and by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports." The overriding purpose of the eligibility
Rules, thus, is not to provide the NCAA with commercial
advantage, but rather the opposite extreme-to prevent
commercializing influences from destroying the unique "product"
of NCAA college football. Even in the increasingly commercial
modem world, this Court believes there is still validity to the
Athenian concept of a complete education derived from fostering
full growth of both mind and body. The overriding purpose behind
the NCAA Rules at issue in this case is to preserve the unique
atmosphere of competition between "student-athletes." This Court,
therefore, rejects the notion that such Rules may be judged or
struck down by federal antitrust law. 109
If, in the alternative, the Sherman Act did apply to the NCAA, Judge
Wiseman concluded that the NCAA would still prevail:
This Court is convinced that the NCAA Rules benefit both players
and the public by regulating college football so as to preserve its
amateur appeal. Moreover, this regulation by the NCAA in fact
makes a better "product" available by maintaining the educational
underpinnings of college football and preserving the stability and
integrity of college football programs. Therefore, Gaines cannot
succeed on the merits of his § 2 claim because the NCAA has
106. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (exempting from antitrust laws agreements covering the
telecasting of sports contests and the combining of professional football leagues).
107. Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
108. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743-44.

109. Id. at 744 (citations omitted).
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shown legitimate business justifications for the Rules at issue. 110
Just what convinced the court that the no-draft and no-agent rules
benefited both college football players and the public is never discussed in
Gaines. What is certain is that whatever it was that convinced Judge Wiseman
on the no-draft rule was unquestionably wrong. The NCAA amended its
bylaws in October 2002 to allow players like Gaines to have their eligibility
reinstated."' The "educational underpinnings," "stability," and "integrity of
college football programs" seem to have been unaffected by the new rule. 112
Certainly the rule cannot be said to have been essential to the product of
college football. Finally, although Gaines was a Section 2 and not a Section 1
case, Judge Wiseman felt that Board of Regents, particularly the dicta about
not paying players, bolstered all of his conclusions.113
3. Banks v. NCAA
The next case to consider an antitrust challenge to the NCAA's
amateurism rules was Banks v. NCAA. 114 The plaintiff in Banks challenged
the no-draft and no-agent rules under Section lof the Sherman Act. 115 In
contrast to Gaines, the district court in Banks readily concluded that the
Sherman Act applied to the NCAA's eligibility rules. 1 6 Citing the "must not
be paid" dicta in Board of Regents, which the NCAA contended absolved it of
antitrust liability, Judge Miller concluded as follows:
It does not appear, however, that this language was intended to
mean that such activities are not subject to the Sherman Act.
Instead, it appears that the Court was explaining its decision to
apply the Rule of Reason to the television plan rather than finding
it to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 117
Judge Miller then turned to the allegations in Banks's complaint. After
rejecting several alternative arguments by Banks, Judge Miller turned to
Banks's central claims:
Mr. Banks argues that the Bylaws at issue constitute unreasonable
restraints upon the activities of individuals like him (and

110. Id. at 746.
111. NCAA, supra note 4, art. 12.2.4.2.3.
112. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746.
113. Id. at 747.
114. 746 F. Supp. at 850.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 857.
117. Id.
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institutions such as Notre Dame), since they are overbroad and
sweep within their ambit many players who are still amateurs in
every meaningful sense of the word, because they have not signed
a professional athletic contract and have received nothing of value
from any team, agent, or other person, except reimbursement for
travel expenses to attend tryouts .... [In particular,] Mr. Banks
has posited a credible anticompetitive effect of Bylaw 12.2.4.2,
the "no-draft" rule. College football, he suggests, is a substantial
moneymaker. The "no-draft" rule will deter better college football
players from testing the waters of professional football for fear of
finding themselves in the no-man's land in which Mr. Banks has
placed himself. Accordingly, better players will remain in school
and out of the NFL draft, enhancing the NCAA's already
profitable product."18
While Judge Miller's opinion mentions no evidence submitted in support
of Banks's claim, the court seemed to consider Banks's allegations to be selfevident, at least with respect to the anticompetitive effects of the no-draft
rules.11 9 Judge Miller, however, next considered the NCAA's response:
In turn, the NCAA has articulated procompetitive effects of its
"no-draft" rule. NCAA regulations are designed to preserve
amateurism and to prevent the professionalization of college
sports to the extent educational objectives would be
overshadowed .... The NCAA contends, with some hyperbole,
that without the restraints of eligibility rules, the distinct
"product", college football, would not survive as an amateur
sport.

120

The task before the court was to conduct the traditional Rule of Reason
analysis, an analysis in which
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied, [including] its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect,... [t]he history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the2 particular remedy,
[and] the purpose or end sought to be attained.' '
Rather than ascertain any facts about the NCAA's contentions, however,

118. Id. at 860.
119. Id. ("Mr. Banks has posited a credible anticompetitive effect of Bylaw 12.2.4.2...").
120. Id. at 860-61.
121. Chi. Bd of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
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the court merely cited to Justice and Board of Regents and accepted all of the
NCAA's assertions as true:
The court agrees with the holdings of these cases and with the
dicta in NCAA v. Board of Regents and finds that reasoning
equally applicable to the Bylaws at issue here. The NCAA's "no
draft" and "no agent" rules are intended to preserve the
intercollegiate football's amateur nature. The concept of
amateurism is no less central to the concept of amateur college
football than are the modest propositions that an athlete must
enroll in the college for which he wishes to play, attend classes,
and maintain a minimal academic standing. Each of those
limitations constitute restraints with some anticompetitive
nature ....
The procompetitive nature of the regulations,
however, outweighs the anticompetitive effects.122
Thus, like the district courts before it, the Banks court concluded that the
NCAA's amateurism rules were lawful under the Rule of Reason without ever
conducting a factual inquiry into the NCAA's proffered procompetitive
justifications. In light of the Rule of Reason analysis set out in Board of
Regents, ruling in favor of the NCAA meant holding that the challenged
eligibility rules were necessary to create the NCAA's product of college
football. As we have already seen, however, there is no question that at least
one of the rules challenged by Braxton Banks was not necessary to college
football: the NCAA effectively dropped its no-draft rule in October 2002.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Banks "failed to allege an
anti-competitive impact" at all. 123 The court's opinion, authored by Judge John
Louis Coffey, a 1943 graduate of Marquette University, 24 is notable for its
harsh tone and for its extraordinarily parochial view of college athletics, a
view demonstrably out of touch with objective reality. Having no factual
record whatsoever to work from, the court cited only to the NCAA's
constitution to conclude that "[t]he NCAA Rules seek to promote fair
competition, encourage the educational pursuits of student-athletes and
prevent commercialism."'' 25
Furthermore, the Court felt that "Banks'
allegation that the no-draft rule restrains trade is absurd."' 26 Judge Coffey
explained why as follows:
122. Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 862.
123. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089.
124. The other member of the panel to vote with Judge Coffey was Judge Robert Allen Grant, a
1928 graduate of the University of Notre Dame.
125. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089.
126. Id.
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None of the NCAA rules affecting college football eligibility
restrain trade in the market for college players because the NCAA
does not exist as a minor league training ground for future NFL
players but rather to provide an opportunity for competition
among amateur students pursuing a collegiate education. Because
the no-draft rule represents a desirable and legitimate attempt "to
keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the
extent that profit making objectives would overshadow
educational objectives," the no-draft rule and other like NCAA
of demarcation between
regulations preserve the bright 1line
27
football.
pay"
college and "play for
The court then made a point of insulating the NCAA from any further,
antitrust challenges by college athletes in the future, at least in the Seventh
Circuit:
We consider college football players as student-athletes
simultaneously pursuing academic degrees that will prepare them
to enter the employment market in non-athletic occupations, and
hold that the regulations of the NCAA are designed to preserve
the honesty and integrity of intercollegiate athletics and foster12fair
8
competition among the participating amateur college students.
Had Judge Coffey bothered to ascertain a factual background of the
NCAA's various bylaws before penning his strongly worded chastisement of
college athletes like Braxton Banks, he may not have been so quick to
conclude that those rules were "designed to preserve the honesty and integrity
of intercollegiate athletics."' 129 Consider just one example that might have
been before the court had Banks been allowed to develop a factual record.
Throughout most of its existence, the NCAA allowed its members to offer
30
Athletes, particularly athletes in
college athletes four-year scholarships.
dangerous sports such as Division I-A football, found the long-term
scholarships desirable, since they effectively shifted the risk of injury to the
schools and allowed an injured athlete to continue pursuing his education. The
unrestrained market worked as any student of economic competition would
have expected. Athletes deciding between institutions that offered four-year
scholarships and those that offered only one-year scholarships frequently
chose the former because of the desirability of those scholarship terms, and the
one-year schools began offering better terms in order to compete with their
127. Id. at 1089-90.
128. Id.at 1090.
129. Id.
130. BYERS, supra note 14, at 75.
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rivals. 13 1 In the 1970s, however, the NCAA adopted a rule prohibiting longterm scholarships. NCAA members were required to offer only one-year
scholarships, and, in fact, the current version of the rule specifically states that
"[i]t is not permissible for an institution to assure the prospect that it
automatically will continue a grant-in-aid past the one-year period if the
recipient sustains an injury that prevents him or her from competing in
intercollegiate athletics."' 32 This rule did nothing to "preserve the honesty and
integrity of intercollegiate athletics." 133 The rule was simply a cost-cutting
measure, one that emphasized that NCAA members' focus was on the athlete
and not on the student. And what about the no-draft and no-agent rules?
Judge Coffey considered them "essential" to college football, stating that their
elimination "would fly in the face of the NCAA's amateurism
requirements." 134 Yet, as we have seen, the no-draft rule was, as a matter of
indisputable fact, quite simply not essential to college football: the NCAA
effectively did away with the no-draft requirement in 2002. As for the noagent rule, the NCAA's own former Executive Director Walter Byers has
criticized the rule as hypocritical and has called for its abolishment, 135 and
several authorities have argued that if a court ever bothered to actually make
legitimate findings of fact the no-agent rule would fail to survive a Rule of
Reason analysis. 136 Even the term "student-athlete," as a matter of historical
fact, is a vestige of the NCAA cartel's cost-containment efforts and has
nothing to do with abstract principles of amateurism. 137
How, then, could the Seventh Circuit panel, which is to say Judges Coffey
and Grant, have gotten it so wrong? A later portion of the opinion provides
the answer: the panel had a preconceived, paternalistic view of what college
athletes should be like, and they had a strong distaste for the lifestyle they
associated with elite athletes like Braxton Banks, athletes who attended
college having hopes of playing professional sports rather than having "a

131. See id. ("Some colleges were offering only one-year grants to recruits, who were being
wooed away by colleges offering 'no-cut' four-year grants. To offset the potential talent drain, many
schools making one-year grant offerings stated that the grants would be renewed so long as the
student continued in intercollegiate athletics").
132. NCAA, supra note 4, art. 15.3.3.1.2.
133. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1090.
134. Id. at 1091.
135. BYERS, supra note 14, at 346, 392.
136. See, e.g., Pekron, supra note 14; and Sherman Act Invalidation,supra note 14.
137. BYERS, supra note 14, at 67-76 (relating the history ofthe term "student-athlete," and noting
that the term was created in response to "the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be identified as
employees by state industrial commissions and the courts," and so the schools would be required to
provide workmen's compensation for their injured players).
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proper focus on their educational pursuits."' 138 Judge Coffey painted this
parade of horribles:
Elimination of the no-draft and no-agent rules would fly in the
face of the NCAA's amateurism requirements. Member schools
might very well be exposed to agents offering the services of their
football playing clients to the highest bidder. In representing their
"pro athlete" clients, the agents would in all probability attempt to
bargain with the NCAA school and might very well expect the
school to offer their client an attractive contract possibly involving
automobiles, condominiums, and cash as compensation in
contravention of the NCAA amateurism rules. Such arrangements
might involve cash compensation payable only in the future after
the player has completed his college eligibility and continues with
an NFL club. The involvement of professional sports agents in
NCAA football would turn amateur intercollegiate athletics into a
sham because the focus of college football would shift from
educating the student-athlete to creating a "minor-league" farm
system out of college football that would operate solely to
improve players' skills for professional football in the NFL. We
should not permit the entry of professional athletes and their
agents into NCAA sports because the cold commercial nature of
professional sports would not only destroy the amateur status of
college athletics but more importantly would interfere with the
athletes proper focus on their educational pursuits and direct their
39
attention to the quick buck in pro sports. 1
Judge Coffey thus clearly had a personal distaste for "cold
commercialism" in college athletics. He did not want to see the "quick buck
of pro sports" infect college campuses, "possibly involving automobiles,
condominiums, and cash as compensation."' 140 Rather, in Judge Coffey's view
of the world, college athletes' proper focus is on their educational pursuits.
Just why a rational economic actor who could sell his athletic abilities for
millions more than his academic talents would focus on academia is never
explained. One wonders, however, whether Judge Coffey would uphold
similar explicit restrictions by law firms on the salaries and employment
conditions of young attorneys (e.g., summer associates, or all attorneys four
years or less out of law school) in order to keep those budding young lawyers
properly focused on their work and to prevent them from being distracted by
138. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the decadent lifestyle espoused by many young, highly-paid urban
professionals. If he would not, why not? What exactly is the principled
difference between a twenty-something attorney at a whiteshoe law firm and a
twenty-something college football player like Braxton Banks?
IV. A UNIFYING THEORY OF FEDERAL COURT APPROVAL OF NCAA
AMATEURISM RULES

Each of the six federal courts to consider antitrust challenges to the
NCAA's amateurism rules concluded that the cases could be dismissed without
requiring the NCAA to prove that the challenged rules were, in fact, essential
to the product of college football. This uniformity cannot be explained by any
governing precedent: two of the cases did not have the benefit of Board of
Regents, and each of the cases after Board of Regents recognized that the
relevant portion of that opinion was only dicta. The best explanation for the
federal courts' treatment of NCAA amateurism rules to date is not legal but
sociological: the judges who ruled on the issue, all of whom were white men
and all but one of whom attended college before 1960,141 had a preconceived
notion of what college athletes should be like, and they quite literally wrote
that viewpoint into law.

This attempt at social engineering is particularly

striking for two reasons: (1) it is demonstrably at odds with factual reality; and
(2) it flies in the face of well-established antitrust principles that call for
competition unrestrained by social norms.
A.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT "STUDENT-ATHLETES" AND THE NECESSITY OF
AMATEURISM RULES

In explaining why the NCAA amateurism rules satisfy the Rule of Reason
(or why the antitrust laws do not apply to those rules at all), the opinions we
have reviewed all make one fundamental assumption: the college athletes at
issue in the cases either are, or should be, students who engage in athletics

141. Biographical data about federal judges, including race and education, is available from the
Federal Judicial Center website. Judges of the United States Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, at

http://www.fjc.gov/public.home.nsflhisj (last visited Apr. 10,2005). The ten judges directly involved
in the six opinions discussed in this article were all white men and they attended college as follows:
Jones, Judge Joseph Louis Tauro, Brown University, A.B., 1953; Justice, Judge Robert Joseph
Kelleher, Williams College, A.B., 1935; McCornack, Judges Alvin Benjamin Rubin at Louisiana
State University, B.S., 1941, Henry Anthony Politz at Louisiana State University, B.A., 1958, and
John Malcolm Duhe at Tulane University, B.S., 1955; Gaines, Judge Thomas Anderton Wiseman,
Vanderbilt University, B.A., 1952; Banks (district), Judge Robert Lowell Miller, Jr., Northwestern
University, B.A., 1972; and Banks, Judges John Louis Coffey at Marquette University, B.A., 1943,
Robert Allen Grant at University of Notre Dame, A.B., 1928, and Joel Martin Flaum at Union
College, B.A., 1958.
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simply as an extracurricular activity. Judge Coffey was most explicit about
this point: "the cold commercial nature of professional sports would not only
destroy the amateur status of college athletics but more importantly would
interfere with the athletes [sic] properfocus on their educationalpursuits and
direct their attention to the quick buck in pro sports."' 142 In other words, the
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs in these cases should be, as the NCAA puts it,
student-athletes. 143
Even a cursory examination of the present day NCAA and its players

would demonstrate that this assumption about so-called "student-athletes" is
factually erroneous. The best players on Division I-A football teams are not,

generally speaking, students first and athletes second-they are, instead, quite
the opposite. The easiest and most relevant way to see this is simply to look at
how the NCAA treats these players. The players are heavily recruited by the
NCAA members' athletic teams; they are allowed to enroll in the schools in
spite of theirpoor academic records; they are given full scholarships that have
little to do with their academic ability and that are tied entirely to athletic
performance.144 The NCAA restricts these students' ability to hold jobs during
the school year, and they are expected to train during the summer. 145 Finally,
the best players, those who aspire to play in the NFL someday, are not
enrolled in an NCAA school because they want to pursue a college education
in lieu of just going to the minor leagues. 146 There is no mainstream minor

142. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091 (emphasis added).
143. As noted above, the term "student-athlete" was created by the NCAA as a cost-cutting
measure by a cartel. In particular, as former NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers has related, the
term was created as part of a marketing campaign to convince courts and state industrial boards not to
force the schools to provide workmen's compensations benefits to seriously injured athletes. See
BYERS, supra note 14, at 67-76.
144. See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 16-36.
145. Id.
146. Mike Williams, former star wide receiver for the University of Southern California,
illustrates the point. As a first year player on a professional NFL team Williams could have earned
millions of dollars a year for his labor. Having a college degree would add nothing to this earning
potential. Accordingly, when a federal district court in New York held an NFL rule requiring that
players be at least three years out of high school in order to be eligible for professional recruiting,
Williams, then a college sophomore, contacted an agent and sought to enter the NFL draft. The
decision was one any rational economic actor would have made: Williams wanted to leave a restricted
market that severely capped his earnings and enter a fairly competitive market that amply rewarded
his most valuable skills. After the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court,
effectively preventing Williams from entering the professional draft, Williams returned all the money
he had been given by the agent and sought to return to USC. The NCAA, however, decided to make
an example of Williams and, in August 2004, declared him permanently ineligible to play college
football.
See
NCAA
Turns
Down
Williams's
Reinstatement
Bid,
at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/football/ncaa/08/26/williams.denied.ap/ index.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2005).
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league for professional football. The NCAA is it.
More importantly, as the discussion in Part III made clear, no federal court
has ever actually received evidence and made findings on the issue of whether
particular NCAA amateurism rules are essential to the product of college
football or other college sports. Rather, the courts whose opinions we have
reviewed have simply assumed that the amateurism rules are necessary,
typically because the dicta in Board of Regents suggests that this is so. 14 7 To
date, however, there appears to be no comprehensive survey evidence that
indicates that the NCAA's amateurism rules are in fact essential to the product
of college football. That is, there is no evidence that suggests that the viewing
public would consider college football to be a different, less desirable product
if college athletes were paid higher stipends by their schools, 148 or were
allowed to receive full four-year scholarships that could not be revoked in the
of the endorsement money
case of injury,149 or were allowed to receive a share
50
coaches.1
their
by
entirely
kept
currently
is
that
Furthermore, there is significant evidence that suggests that rules such as
these are not only unnecessary but outright undesirable. For example, in the
1980s the U.S. Olympic Committee, an association that was once identified as
the leading institution of amateurism, moved away from the core requirements
of the old Victorian principle and now allows paid professionals to compete in
the Olympic games, a change that was encouraged by the International
Olympic Committee and adopted in most countries. 15 1 The viewing public did
not respond with any sense of outrage at the changes, and if anything, the
commercial popularity of the Olympic games increased. 152 With respect to
college football in particular, the objective accuracy of the NCAA's assertions
147. See supra Part III; see also Pekron, supra note 14, at 53 ("Whenever a court of law has
discussed amateurism, the court has always simply assumed that it is necessary to produce college
athletics. However, the NCAA has never been required to prove that without amateurism, college
athletics would be indistinguishable from professional athletics").
148. See NCAA, supra note 4, art. 12.01.4 (limiting total "grant-in-aid" that college athletes can
receive).
149. See id. art. 15.3.3.1.2 ("[iut is not permissible for an institution to assure the prospect that it
automatically will continue a grant-in-aid past the one-year period if the recipient sustains an injury
that prevents him or her from competing in intercollegiate athletics").
150. College football and basketball coaches frequently receive hundreds of thousands of dollars
a year in endorsement money from apparel manufacturers like NIKE. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 14,
at 81 (listing examples). NCAA bylaws permit coaches to receive these exorbitant sums of money but
prohibit college athletes from receiving any amount of it. See NCAA, supra note 4, art. 12.5.1.
151. When asked about the change, the U.S. Committee's Director of Public Information replied
simply: "We wanted to rid ourselves of the hypocrisy." ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 20.
152. See, e.g., Global TV Viewing of Athens 2004 Olympic Games Breaks Records, BEIJING
2008, Oct. 12, 2004, availableat http://en.beijing-2008.org/87/55/article211635587.shtml (last visited
Apr. 4, 2005).
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about the necessity of its amateurism rules is significantly undercut by the
following fact: in 2003,both the Nebraska legislature and the California senate
passed bills that called for their states' schools to reject the NCAA's
amateurism rules and to pay college athletes. 53 Surely, then, it cannot be
assumed that college football would crumble without the NCAA's amateurism
rules, at least not in the football-powerhouse states of the Cornhuskers and the
Trojans.
How, then, did the federal courts whose opinions we have reviewed reach
the conclusions that they did? How could they have been willing to simply
ignore these facts and not even consider the possibility that it is the players'
affiliation with a school, and not their lack of endorsement contracts or ties to
agents, that makes college football a truly distinct product? 154 The only
consistent answer appears to be that the judges in question did not want to see
this reality. As the dissent in Banks, discussed in greater detail below, put it,
when "confronted with the clash between soothing nostalgia and distressing
reality," the judges in these cases simply chose the former, they literally
asserted that their personal beliefs, demonstrably false as a matter of fact, were

155
true as a matter of law.

In the very first case to address the amateurism rules, for example, Judge
Tauro simply refused to view the plaintiff college hockey player as a supplier
of labor, or indeed as a market participant of any sort. "The plaintiff is
currently a student, not a businessman in the traditional sense, and certainly
not a 'competitor' within the contemplation of the antitrust laws."' 56 No legal
basis or explanation was offered for this conclusion. In Gaines, Judge
Wiseman stated quite clearly that he found it difficult to view college football
players as anything other than students: "This Court is hard-pressed to see any
validity to the parties' interpretation of college football players like Brad
Gaines as 'sellers' and NCAA schools and professional football leagues or
teams as 'buyers' in an economic market."' 157 Furthermore, this conclusion was
clearly part of a larger belief system of Judge Wiseman about the nature of
college athletics: "Even in the increasingly commercial modem world, this
Court believes there is still validity to the Athenian concept of a complete

153. See Legislature Votes to Pay Cornhuskers,supra note 57, at S3; Wieberg, supra note 57.
154. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has stated that it is the "identification of this 'product' with
an academic tradition [that] differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league
baseball." Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 10 1-02.
155. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1100 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
156. Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303.
157. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 745.
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158 The
education derived from fostering full growth of both mind and body."'
Victorian, aristocratic underpinnings of the concept of amateurism are evident
in Judge Wiseman's statement.
For his part, Judge Coffey was clearly opposed to seeing his own vision of
amateur athletics soiled by the "cold commercial nature of professional
sports."' 59 Without the NCAA's various concerted restraints, "[m]ember
schools might very well be exposed to agents offering the services of their
football playing clients to the highest bidder."1 60 If this were to happen then
"the agents would in all probability attempt to bargain with the NCAA school
and might very well expect the school to offer their client an attractive contract
possibly involving automobiles, condominiums, and cash as compensation in
contravention of the NCAA amateurism rules."' 161 And of course, all of that
would be undesirable because it "would interfere with the athletes [sic] proper
focus on their educational pursuits and direct their attention to the quick buck
in pro sports."' 62 If his obvious distaste for the lifestyles of talented young
athletes had not distracted him so, Judge Coffey might have noticed that he
was quite clearly making an argument that "competition itself is
63
unreasonable."1

B.

THE LAW PROVIDESA REMEDY EVEN IF THE JUDGES WILL NOT

What makes the federal courts' treatment of NCAA amateurism rules to
date particularly troubling is that the law appears to provide a remedy to
college athletes who feel exploited, or at least the right to have the NCAA be
required to prove its assertions regarding the necessity of its various cartel
agreements. Not only have nearly all commentators to address the issue
reached this conclusion, 164 but then-Chief Judge Flaum of the Seventh Circuit
also provided a cogent argument making this very point in his dissent in
Banks.

165

Judge Flaum first noted that "[i]t is well settled that an agreement among
employers to control a material term of employment harms competition in the

158. Id. at 744.
159. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696 (stating that "the Rule of Reason does not
support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable").
164. See supra note 14.
165. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1094-1100 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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labor market at issue."16 6 Casting aside Athenian notions of "proper"
education and withholding any feelings of aversion he may have had to the
lifestyle of talented young athletes, Judge Flaum then provided the following
common-sense economic analysis of Braxton Banks's claim:
Banks also alleges how the NCAA rules at issue-I will focus upon
the no-draft rule-harm competition in that market: they foreclose
players "from choosing a major college football team based on the
willingness of the institution to waive or change [the] rule[ ]." It is
hardly a revelation that colleges fiercely compete for the most
promising high school football players-the players who,
incidentally, are most likely to feel constrained by the challenged
rules two or three years down the line. If the no-draft rule were
scuttled, colleges that promised their athletes the opportunity to
test the waters in the NFL draft before their eligibility expired, and
return if things didn't work out, would be more attractive to
athletes than colleges that declined to offer the same opportunity.
The no-draft rule eliminates this potential element of competition
among colleges, the purchasers of labor in the college football
labor market. It categorically rules out a term of employment that
players, the suppliers of labor in that market, would find
67

advantageous. 1

Acting as he would towards any other antitrust plaintiff, Judge Flaum
concluded that Banks had indeed stated a claim under the Sherman Act, "[t]he
NCAA's protestations notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that Banks has
alleged an anticompetitive effect in a relevant market." 68
Judge Flaum made two other particularly noteworthy points. First, he
identified what every other judge to write a published opinion on this issue
somehow missed: a proper Rule of Reason analysis of the amateurism rules
requires a factual inquiry that is not satisfied by merely looking to the NCAA's
constitution and that cannot be disposed of on a motion to dismiss. Judge
Flaum put it this way:
I add here a caveat to avert any potential misunderstandings. My
point is only that Banks has properly alleged an anticompetitive
effect in a relevant market and has demonstrated antitrust injury,
and hence that his damages action should survive the NCAA's
motion to dismiss. But this is, of course, only the first step. To
166.
Spencer
167.
168.

Id.at 1095 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (citing Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Nichols v.
Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1967)).
Banks, 977 F.2d at 1095 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
Id.at 1096 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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ultimately prevail, Banks also must demonstrate, under the rule of
reason, that the no-agent and no-draft rules, despite their
anticompetitive effects, are not "justifiable. means of fostering
competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore
procompetitive" on the whole. It may very well be that the nodraft and no-agent rules are essential to the survival of college
football as a distinct and viable product, in which case Banks
would lose. A lively debate has arisen among those who have
already considered this matter. I opt not to join the fray here, for I
think it unwise to weigh pro- and anticompetitive effects under the
69
rule of reason on a motion to dismiss.
Put simply, Judge Flaum pointed out to the Banks majority that there was
no factual basis for their conclusion that the no-draft and no-agent rules were
essential to the survival Of college football as a distinct and viable product.
Flaum's interpretation of
That standard, as we have seen, was not simply Judge
170
the law but was directly stated in Boardof Regents.
Judge Flaum's second point was psychological. Though particularly
applicable to the majority opinion in Banks, Judge Flaum's insight here applies
to all of the opinions we have seen:
Today's decision, by holding that Banks has not alleged that the
rules are anticompetitive in the first instance, deprives him of the
opportunity to join this issue on remand. As I have discussed, it is
difficult to reconcile this holding with a sound reading of Banks'
complaint. On a broader level, I am also concerned that today's
decision-unintentionally, to be sure, for it suggests that a "more
artfully drafted complaint" could have alleged an anticompetitive
effect in this market-will provide comfort to the NCAA's
are
rules
eligibility
that its
assertion
incredulous
"noncommercial." The NCAA would have us believe that
intercollegiate athletic contests are about spirit, competition,
camaraderie, sportsmanship, hard work (which they certainly
are) ... and nothing else. Players play for the fun of it, colleges
get a kick out of entertaining the student body and alumni, but the
relationship between players and colleges is positively
noncommercial. It is consoling to buy into these myths, for they
remind us of a more innocent era-an era where recruiting
169. Id. at 1098 (citations omitted) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
170. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 ("Rather, what is critical is that this case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essentialif the product is to be available at
all").
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scandals were virtually unknown, where amateurism was more a
reality than an ideal, and where post-season bowl games were
named for commodities, not corporations. On the flip side, it is
disquieting to think of college football as a business, of colleges as
17
the purchasers of labor, and of athletes as the suppliers. 1
None of the opinions we have seen explained why they could not view
college athletes as suppliers of labor. To Judge Tauro, Stephen Jones was
simply a student and not a businessman; to Judges Wiseman and Coffey, the
same was true of Bradford Gaines and Braxton Banks. In contrast, citing
ProfessionalEngineers for the proposition that non-commercial values cannot
justify anticompetitive restraints, Judge Flaum directly confronted the
distressing reality presented by Braxton Banks's case: "[t]he NCAA continues
to purvey, even in this case, an outmoded image of intercollegiate sports that
72
no longer jibes with reality. The times have changed."'
interesting to note Judge Coffey's response to Judge Flaum's
Finally, it is,
dissent. Rather than point to evidence in the record (there was none) to
demonstrate factual inaccuracies in Judge Flaum's opinion or address the fact
that Professional Engineers clearly held that non-commercial justifications
cannot excuse anticompetitive restraints, Judge Coffey responded as anyone
avoiding a "distressing reality" would be expected to respond: denial.
The dissent takes a surprisingly cynical view of college athletics
and contends that "colleges squeeze out of their players one or two
more years of service" because the no-draft rule forces the player
to choose between continued collegiate eligibility and entering the
draft. This description of players "selling their services" to NCAA
colleges stands in stark contrast to the academic and amateurism
requirements of the vast majority of college athletic programs that,
in compliance with the NCAA rules and regulations, are
foreclosed from offering cash compensation or "non-permissible
awards, extra benefits, or excessive or improper expenses not
,,173
authorized by NCAA legislation ....
In other words, NCAA members could not possibly be exploiting their
players because they have all agreed to limit their players' compensation. If
74
that sounds absurd, that is because it is. 1
171. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1098-99 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1099 (Flaum, J, dissenting).
173. Id. at 1092 (citing 1992-1993 NCAA DIVISION I OPERATING MANUAL §§ 14.01.5.1,
14.01.5.2).
174. Byers makes a noteworthy comment on this point: "Today's educational reformers seem
increasingly content to engage in a pedantic tautology. Players may not receive money, except what
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A MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH THE COURTS' ANTITRUSTANALYSIS

OF NCAA AMATEURISM RULES

Because of their shared assumption that college athletes are students only
and not market participants of any sort, the six courts whose opinions we have
reviewed all missed one critical point about their cases: they were dealing with
human labor. Let us use Gaines as an example. Judge Wiseman explicitly
stated that he was "hard-pressed" to accept the notion of football players as
suppliers of labor and colleges as purchasers. 75 Accordingly, he held that the
Sherman Act did not even apply to the NCAA's amateurism rules. 176 Then,
however, maintaining this same assumption that college football players are
not suppliers of labor but are only "student-athletes," Judge Wiseman
proceeded to offer his alternative analysis if it were assumed that the Sherman
Act did apply. 177 In that case, as we saw above, the judge summarily
concluded the NCAA bylaws would survive a Rule of Reason analysis. 178
Judge Wiseman missed a critical point. By erroneously holding on to his
first assumption during his Rule of Reason analysis, Judge Wiseman failed to
consider the significance of the fact that he was applying antitrust law to
restraints on a market for human labor. This fact is critical because the
consumers in this market are not consumers at large, but rather the purchasers
of that human labor, namely the colleges. Judge Flaum was the only judge in
any of the cases to recognize this point:
[I]t is important first to identify the consumers and the market at
issue in this case. By "consumers," the NCAA apparently means
people who watch college football. These individuals certainly
are consumers in the college football product market, but the
market at issue here is the college football labor market, and the
NCAA member colleges are consumers in that market. 179
Furthermore, in this market it is not the harm to the purchasers of labor or
to consumers at large that is relevant but rather the harm to the suppliers of
labor that matters. 80 To hold otherwise, to focus on the general notion of
"consumer benefit" in this context, leads to the abhorrent result of allowing
we give them, because they must remain amateurs to be eligible under our rules. They are amateurs if
our rules say they are. Thus, they may only receive what our rules permit." BYERS, supra note 14, at
390.
175. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 745.
176. Id.at 748.
177. Id. at 745.
178. Id.at 747.
179. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1098 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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purchasers of labor to unlawfully exploit one class of people (in this case,
predominantly African American college athletes) for the purpose of
benefiting another, presumably a more important class of people (the
consumers of college athletics, in particular the viewers of televised men's
181
football and basketball games).
Consider an example from a different context. In June 2002, a class action
antitrust suit was filed on behalf of fashion models in New York City. 82 The
lawsuit alleges that modeling agencies conspired to fix the wages of the
models at unfairly low levels. If the judge in this case focuses on the welfare
of consumers at large, the models should lose, even if their allegations are
true: the consumers of magazines and fashion shows actually benefit from the
exploitation of the models because their magazines and fashion show tickets
should cost less. That result, however, is absurd. It would justify price fixing
and human exploitation by employers in any industry.
The same is no less true in cases challenging the NCAA's amateurism
rules. The fact that Ohio State alumni are better off because their alma mater
can retain star football players at cartel wages should not justify imposing
otherwise unlawful restraints on the talented young men who make up the
team. In short, it is the laborers, not the purchasers of labor or consumers at
large, who matter in labor market antitrust cases. As Judge Flaum put it: "It
would be perverse ...to hold that the very object of the law's solicitude and
the persons most directly concerned-perhaps the only persons concernedcould not challenge the restraint."' 183 What is most troubling about the dicta in
Board of Regents, then, is that it suggests that human exploitation is
acceptable and even desirable. By stating in his rambling list that "athletes
must not be paid" Justice Stevens implies that it is okay to exploit college
athletes-io allow colleges to conspire to limit scholarships terms to one year,
for example, so that injured athletes can be cheaply and quickly disposed of181. The district judge in Law, which as noted above involved a conspiracy by NCAA cartel
members to fix the wages of assistant basketball coaches, noted precisely this point in granting the
assistant coaches' motion for summary judgment on the issue of antitrust liability:
If price-fixing buyers were allowed to justify their actions by claiming procompetitive
benefits in the product market, they would almost always be able to do so by arguing that
the restraint was designed to reduce their costs and thereby make them collectively more
competitive sellers. To permit such a justification would be to give businesses a blanket
exemption from the antitrust laws and a practically limitless license to engage in horizontal
price-fixing aimed at suppliers. This license the Court will not issue-even in the unique
context of intercollegiate athletics.
902 F. Supp. at 1406.
182. See Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Civil Action No. 02-4911 (S.D.N.Y.).
183. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1098 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, II, ANTITRUST LAW 338(c), at 200 (1978)).
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so long as the TV-viewing public is fed a little more cheap entertainment and
college alumni enjoy an occasional pleasant dose of nostalgia. Indeed,
perhaps encouraged by its success in exploiting collegeathletes and prevailing
against them in court, the NCAA decided to fix the wages of other low-level
human inputs in the production of college athletics. 184 In 1991, the cartel
adopted a rule fixing the annual salary of assistant basketball coaches at
$12,000.185 The primary case cited by the NCAA in its defense was, of
course, Board of Regents. Fortunately for the assistant coaches, neither the
district judge nor the judges on the Tenth Circuit were persuaded by the
NCAA's transparent platitudes about amateurism and enhancing competition,
all for the ultimate benefit of the consuming public. "To permit such a
justification," the district court judge, wrote, "would be to give businesses a
blanket exemption from the antitrust laws and a practically limitless license to
engage in horizontal price-fixing aimed at suppliers. This license the Court
will not issue-even in the unique context of intercollegiate athletics."' 86
V. CONCLUSION

The NCAA has enjoyed a virtual exemption from federal antitrust law
with respect to its amateurism rules. This exemption is based not on any
principled construction of federal antitrust law, but rather is the result of the
practical reality that the individuals sitting on the federal bench, at least in the
cases to date, have been "hard pressed" to view college athletes as anything
other than students engaged in extracurricular activities. Confronted with "the
clash between soothing nostalgia and distressing reality," these judges, all of
them white men who attended college before 1960, simply refused to view
college athletes, even the participants in big-time college football, as suppliers
of labor in an economic market.187 Federal judges, however, "take an oath to
enforce all laws, without regard to their (or the litigants') social, political, or
religious beliefs."'188 Judges hearing future antitrust challenges to the NCAA's
amateurism rules must require the NCAA to prove its various assertions about
those rules with actual evidence. The mere fact that the NCAA's assertions
paint a prettier picture of the world, or conform with the judge's own college
experience, should be irrelevant to both the legal characterization of college
athletes and to the ultimate outcome of the case.

184. See Law, 902 F. Supp. at 1400.
185. Id. at 1400.

186. Id. at 1406.
187. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1100 (Flaum, J., dissenting).

188. Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2003).

